A health plan opened its patient access API so members could connect the health apps they choose. Before launch, testers found that the login flow trusted the wrong web address. A single convincing link could carry a member through the real login and hand their records to someone else.
AT A GLANCE
- Industry: Regional health plan
- Test type: SMART on FHIR authorization and API testing
- Severity: High, CVSS 7.4
- Outcome: Every fix retested in the sandbox before the app gallery opened
Federal interoperability rules push health plans to open their data to third-party apps. The plan wanted the full authorization flow tested the way an outside developer, or an attacker, would approach it.
What's Inside the Case Study
- How a look-alike web address slipped past the redirect check
- How a member could log in to the real site and still hand over access
- Why the missing PKCE step turned a stolen code into a working token
- What claims and clinical data reveal about a member
- The four fixes that secured the flow before the app gallery opened